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1 Introduction
This study investigates the determinents of quits among profe
sional and managerial employees of a large manufacturing firm. It
the first study of these types of employees to utilize detail<
personnel data to investigate the influence of recent promotions, p<
and performance ratings on quit behavior. The role of recent prom
tions is emphasized below, where it is argued that the firm's interns
labor market is segmented into non-competing groups, based on educ?
tional background and organizational experience and training. Thi
segmentation, and the stochastic nature of promotional opportunities
results in unequal promotion probabilities among equally abl
employees. Two testable hypotheses emerge from this model: (1
absence of recent promotion will, ceteris par ibus
,
increase th
likelihood of a quit; and (2) the more homogeneous the group o
employees studied the smaller this effect will be. If the firs
hypothesis is correct it is a serious concern for management, since m
increased quit rate is both costly and, given the nature of th
problem, difficult to change.
Below, models of quit rates are estimated for both the complet
sample of employees and for sub-samples of employees defined by th*
factors that segment the internal labor market. Estimates of th
effect of promotions on quits among the subsamples suggest whethei
those factors have produced unequal promotional opportunities thai
encouraged quits. For the entire sample of almost 8,500 employees,




quitting. Moreover, the estimates for the subsamples show that in most
cases, among the more homogeneous groups of employees, recent promotion
has no significant effect on quit probabilities.
The balance of this paper is organized as follows: in the second
section some of the recent literature on quit behavior is reviewed, and
a quit model that incorporates the concepts of a segmented internal
labor market and a stochastic promotion process is formulated; in the
third section the personnel data used and the variables created are
described; in the fourth section the parameter estimates of the various
models are presented; the last section contains some concluding
remarks
.
II. Models of Quit Behavior
Economists have only recently begun to study quit behavior within
organizations, although a substantial body of research on the subject
can be found in psychology and management journals (Arnold and
Feldman, Dreher, Keller, Scholl). This organizational research
generally focuses on job satisfaction as a major determinant of
quitting; job satisfaction depending on satisfaction with pay, promo-
tions, supervision and work content. Other important factors are
perceived external opportunities and organizational commitment
(Scholl), and performance and absenteeism (Dreher, Keller). Keller
for example, found that low performance ratings were associated with
high turnover rates. Findings that low pay, poor perceived promotional
opportunities, or low performance ratings increase quits is consistent
with both economic and job satisfaction models of turnover.
Economic research has moved from studies of turnover rates using
industry data (Parsons), to studies utilizing longitudinal survey dat
or personnel records of firms, to investigate individual quit behavic
The recent studies that use longitudinal data have been concerned wi
race and gender differences in quit rates (Blau and Kahn, Viscus
Meitzen), or with testing human capital and job match theories
quitting (Mincer and Jovanovic, Miller). Other recent work has sho
that non-portable pension benefits reduce quit rates (Mitchell , 1 982) .
Recently, Weiss studied quit behavior among newly hired producti
workers of a manufacturing firm. Weiss' model includes variables th
represent expected alternative wages (i.e. human capital variables
job satisfaction, and the cost of quitting. He found that high scho
graduates and those employed when they applied for work at the subje
firm were significantly less likely to quit during the first six mont
on the job. On the other hand, whites and those with more complex jol
were significantly more likely to quit. Blue collar workers appear n<
to enjoy more complex jobs.
The present study analyzes the quit behavior of a diverse group c
professional and managerial employees of a major manufacturing firn
The heterogeneity of the sample suggests a model of job quitting the
incorporates the idea of a segmented internal labor market. Althoug
the data set does not contain direct information on job satisfactior
the wage and job histories of the employees, as well as their persona
attributes, provide a rich basis for analyzing the determinants c
quit behavior.
A simple economic model of quit behavior can be based on utilit
maximization. In each time period (a one year period is used here)
each employee compares the present value of the expected lifetime
utility of his current job with that of his other alternatives,
including leisure. If the discounted expected utility of any alterni-
tive is greater than the cost of quitting plus the discounted expected
utility of the current job, the employee quits.
(1) Q = 1 if V(Uj) > V(U ) + C (employee quits)
= if V(Uj) V(U ) + C (employee does not quit)
where
V(Uj) = discounted expected lifetime utility of alternate job j,
j = 1 , . . . , n
V(U ) = discounted expected lifetime utility of current job
C z cost of quitting
Since the expected utilities (and the cost of quitting) are not
directly observable, the empirical model necessarily relies on proxy
variables. V(U^) depends primarily on the personal attributes of the
employee that affect his productivity. Since the job market for each
occupation will generate a different distribution of wage offers,
variables that represent occupation are included in the model. Note
that V(U ) also depends on personal attributes, as well as on manage-
ment decisions, and various aspects of the specific job that determine
job satisfaction. Management decisions with respect to pay, perform-
ance ratings and promotions are signals that the employee translates
into expectations about future progress within the firm. The cost of
quitting depends on personal risk preferences with respect to job
stability vs. job change, the extent of family responsibilities,
and vested , non-portable pension benefits. The specific variables that
proxy for these factors in the empirical analysis are discussed in
next section.
The preceding discussion states that some personal attributes w
influence both V(U.) and V(U Q ). Since these effects are not obsei
able, the effect of these personal attributes on the quit probabil
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Attributes that represent general training (e.g. education
attainment and prior work experience) are the likely candidates f
this situation, since that type of training raises productivity (
presumably compensation) equally among all employees. Weiss, f
example, found that years of schooling was negatively related to qu
propensity, that a variable that proxied for the better job altern
tives associated with increased educational attainment was positive
(but not significantly) related to quit propensity.
The empirical model is derived from (1) by positing the followi
relationships
:
(2) V(Uj) = f U ± )
(3) V(U ) = g (X^Wj)




i = personal attributes that affect productivity
Wj = job characteristics and management signals that
determine satisfaction with and expected future
values of current job
Z
t = variables reflecting family responsibilities
R = vested, non-portable pension benefits (assumed to
depend on length of job tenure)
e = personal risk preference (a normally and independently
distributed random variable)
The emphasis in this study is on the impact on quits of management
signals, i.e., pay, performance ratings, and promotions. These are
policy variables for the firm. The expected effect of pay is clear:
higher wages should reduce quitting, since it increases V(U Q ) relative
to the alternatives V(U^): The argument with regard to performance
ratings is more subtle. Better performers may have more attractive
employment opportunities outside the firm to balance the expected
bright future with their current employer. However, internal perfor-
mance appraisals are likely to have more value within the firm than to
external observers, to whom the appraisal process is not well known.
Thus logic suggests that good performance will enhance the expected
returns at the present job more than at alternative jobs, and thus
reduce the quit propensity.
The role of promotions is complex, because they depend not only on
the ability and skills of the employees, but also on the existence of
openings for which they are qualified. Random events, beyond manage-
ment control, create different promotional opportunities across the
firm (Wise). Vacancies occur randomly due to quits, unexpected
retirements, deaths or disabilities, or unequal rates of expansion or
contraction of different components of the firm.
If the firm operated as a single internal labor market, the ran
aspect of promotional opportunities would cause no problems. The m
able employee eligible for each vacancy would be promoted. ^ Howev
if the firm's internal labor market is segmented into non-compet
groups, with limited mobility among them, then promotion rates will
be equalized among equally able employees. In other words, "being
the right place at the right time" can effect promotion probabilities
Why should the firm have a segmented internal labor market?
underlying reason is the heterogeneity of its professional and mar
gerial work force. In most cases, engineers are not substitutes 1
accountants, nor are marketing managers for production manager
Differences in educational background and work assignments give rise
differences in specific training, which create non-competing groups.^
Table 1 sheds some light on the variance in promotion rates at t
subject firm in 1980. Table 1 presents the percent of employe
promoted during the year by major field of study and functional div
sion, by most recent performance rating (the highest rating is 5, t
lowest is 2). The table shows a wide variation in promotion rat
across majors and functions within each performance rating grou
Table 1 also shows the expected monotonic decline in promotion rat
across performance rating groups.
If, as hypothesized, absence of recent promotion increases qu
propensity, the cost of the segmented labor market will be increas
turnover. Moreover, the specialization of labor that gives rise to tl
segmentation is not something a large, complex firm can easily reduci
nor will it necessarily find it desirable to do so.
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If promotion rates were equal among equally qualified employees,
and all the relevant factors that enter the promotion decision could be
accurately measured, then a promotion dummy variable would be redundant
in a quit model that included those factors. However, the random
occurrence of vacancies, and the fact that all the factors that
determine promotion rates cannot be measured, implies that promotion
probability will have an independent effect on the quit probability.
In the case of stochastic promotion probabilities, the probability
of being promoted (P) can be express as:
(5) P = c^x. + £.w. + u
where X and W are the personal and job related factors defined above
(with promotions deleted from W)
,
and u is a random disturbance that
accounts for the stochastic factors beyond management control and the
factors the analyst cannot measure. Now, omitting P from the model
reduces the model's explanatory power, and may also produce biased
parameter estimates for the variables correlated with P. Therefore, a,
variable reflecting recent promotion experience is included in the
model
.
The heterogeneity of labor in the firm plays a key role in the
influence of promotions on voluntary separations. The more homogeneous
the group of employees, the less will be the within group variance in
promotion rates, ceteris par ibus
,
because the employees are closer
substitutes. Therefore, the impact of promotions on quits should be
smaller among more homogeneous groups of employees. Below quit models
are estimated for both the entire sample of employees, and for sub-
samples of more homogeneous employees. The subsamples are defined
by major field of study for highest degree attained, and by functi
division of the firm. If the labor market segmentation hypothesi
correct, these factors are most likely to give rise to difference
promotion probabilities, so estimates of the promotion effect on q
should be most sensitive to these groupings.
Using the symbols defined above, the empirical model is obtai|
by substituting (2), (3), and (4) into (1).
(6) Q = f (Xi ,Wj,Zt ,R,e)
The vector W^ includes variables that measure pay, performance rati|
and recent promotion, as well as location among the firm's functioj
divisions and pay grades. The specific variables are described fu!
in the next section.
One aspect of the model presented here warrants further disci
sion. Although most models of quit behavior include a measure of
tenure(Blau and Kahn, Viscusi, Keller, Mitchell (1982)), Weiss I
argued that it is endogenous to a quit model, and its inclusion resul
in sample selection bias. In effect, longer service employees a
those who each year choose not to quit, and thus are assumed to have
different average value for risk preference than employees with short
service. Thus the error term in the quit model is correlated wi
years of service, resulting in biased parameter estimates for ti
service variables, and for the other variables in the model correlati
with length of service (which will be all the variables correlated wi
quits, if this view is correct).
The selection bias argument rests on the assumption that there ai
unmeasured personal attributes that affect both length of service ai
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annual quit probability. The sample selection criteria used here
deletes from the study both short and long term employees, two groups
which should and do have different quit probabilities than the balance
of the employees.-3 Job-matching theory (Miller, Mincer and Jovanovic)
suggests that in their first few years of service employees go through
an evaluation period, during which the true nature of their job is
revealed. The high rate of separations among short tenure employees
reflects decisions based on information about the job that could only
be obtained after employment. Individuals who find a poor match with
their expectations thus have a very high likelihood of quitting.
Employees with less than three years of service were deleted from the
study
.
On the other hand, the quit behavior of long service employees is
often influenced by health and retirement considerations. Since quit
rates rise sharply after about 25 years of service, employees with more
than that much service were also deleted from the study. Thus the
employees in this study are clearly more homogeneous with respect to
obvious unmeasured attributes that influence quit behavior than all the
employees of the firm. The potential bias that remains is evaluated
below.
Ill . Data and Variables
The data used in this study were drawn from the personnel file of
a large U.S. manufacturing firm. To limit the scope of the study, and
avoid possible racial and sexual differences in job mobility prefer-
ences, the sample was restricted to white males. The sample was
further limited to professional and managerial employees (exempt under
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the Fair Labor Standards Act) who were hired at least one year prior
January 1, 1981, the beginning of the year studied. These restricts
resulted in a sample of over 9,000 employees.
Preliminary tabulations revealed that the separation rates amc
employees with the lowest performance rating ("unsatisfactory") we
over 9 0%. These terminations were judged not to be truly volunts
separations. Therefore, the very low performers, along with t
employees with very short or very long lengths of service, were delet
from the study. After deletions from missing data the sample consist
of 8424 employees.
The variables used in the empirical analysis are defined belo
They are grouped into three categories, corresponding to the vectors
W and Z, and length of service.
1 . Personal attributes affecting productivity.
a. Previous experience (and its square) : The estimated years i
the labor force between receipt of bachelor's degree and date
employment at the firm. It is reduced by two years for receipt of
master's degree and five years for receipt of a doctorate.
b. Educational attainment : Two dummy variables for receipt of a
master's or a doctorate (all employees in the sample had at
least a bachelor's degree).
c. Maior field of studv : A set of eight dummy variables reflec
ting the field of the person's highest degree (see Table 1 for th
fields; employees with engineering degrees, and those with scienc
degrees, were each aggregated into a single group.)
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2. Job characteristics
a. Grade level : Two dummy variables indicating employment in (1)
the lowest two salary grades or (2) the third salary grade, as
of 1/1/81.
b. Performance ratines : Three dummy variables indicating the
rating received most recently prior to 1/1/81. The lowest
rating included in the study (satisfactory) is the omitted
reference group.
c. Salary : The ratio of the individuals ' s salary to the mean
salary in his salary grade. This relative measure seemed most
appropriate in representing the signals management gives
employees. This is the comparison that the employee will find
most revealing of his apparent worth to the firm.
d. Salary change : The percentage increase in salary between
1/1/78 and 1/1/81. This variable is another management signal
that may affect separation decisions.
e. Functional area : Is a set of dummy variables to distinguish
jobs among the major operating divisions of the firm (see Table 1).
f. Promotion : A dummy variable to identify employees who received
a promotion during 1980, the year prior to that studied.
Promotion was defined as an increase in salary grade level.
3. Family responsibility
a. Marital status : A dummy variable to distinguish married (1)
versus single (0) employees.
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b. Children : A dummy variable that has the value of one for
married employees with children under age 18 in the household,
and is zero otherwise.
4. Length of Service (and its square): Measured from date of emplo
ment to January 1, 1981.
IV. Empirica l Findings
In this section I report the parameters estimated for equati
(6). First, the model is estimated for the entire sample of 84
employees. Then estimates were made for three groups of subsample
defined by major field of study, functional area within the firm, a
performance rating. The first two groups test the labor mark'
segmentation hypothesis, showing whether the promotion variable has
smaller, less significant impact on quits among the more homogeneoi
groups of employees than for the sample as a whole. The latter groi
tests whether the promotion effect is constant across all performanc
ratings. There is reason to believe that employees with high perforn
ance ratings will be less sensitive to absence of promotion tha
employees with lower ratings. The better performers may realize, an
may have been informed by their superiors, that the absence of promo
tion is the result of the absence of an appropriate vacancy, and that
promotion is forthcoming with the next appropriate opening. Simila
realizations or assurances are much less likely for poorer performers
who are thus more likely to respond to the absence of promotion b
quitting
.
Table 2 presents the logit estimates of the parameters of equatio
(6). Note that the overall quit rate for the year (1981) was only 2.1
14
percent (172/8424). Therefore, since the variance of the quit rate is
quite small (.02), it is difficult to "explain" much of that variance.
As hypothesized, recent promotion significantly reduces the quit
probability, by approximately one percentage point (.0094) at the mean
quit probability. Employees receiving any of the three highest
performance ratings are significantly less likely to quit than
employees who received only a satisfactory rating. Neither the
relative salary variable (RSAL) nor the change in salary variable
(DSAL) are significant, although each has the expected inverse rela-
tionship with the quit probability. Thus the major management rewards
(and signals to employees) all have the expected impact on the quit
probability.
The variables that proxy for the cost of quitting also have a
significant impact on the quit probability. Employees who are married,
and who have children under age 18 in the household, are significantly
less likely to quit than unmarried employees or those without children.
Years of service, entered in quadratic form, shows a falling quit
probability until about 20.5 years of service, after which it rises
gradually. This is generally consistent with the hypothesis that
tenure reduces quit propensities. The rise after 20 years of service
may reveal the beginning of early retirement decisions.
The variables that represent general training, educational
attainment (MASTERS, DOCTORATE) and previous experience (PREVEXP), do
not have a significant effect on quits. This is consistent with the
choice model which indicated that these factors would effect both the
expected utility of the current job and of alternative jobs.
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Table 2 also shows that some major fields, functions and sala
grades significantly influence the quit probability. Employees wi
degrees in computer science, accounting and finance were more likely
quit than employees with other degrees. However, employees in t
financial and auditing division (FINAUDIT) were less likely to qui
In addition, employees in the lowest salary grades were more likely
quit than other employees. A likelihood ratio test was used
determine whether the sets of major field and function dummy variabl
were significant. Each test was significant, indicating that major ar
function as groups are significant factors, and supporting the sut
sample analysis that follows.'
One concern, noted above, was the possible bias that results frc
unmeasured attributes correlated with both the length of servic
variables and the quit probability. Although service is significantl
related to the quit probability, the simple correlation is not high (
=
-.11), and the relationship is quantitatively small. Calculated a
the mean length of service and quit probability, an additional year o
service reduces the quit probability by less than four-tenths of on
percent (.0037). Since the correlations between the umeasured attri
butes and the other explanatory variables is unknown, it is difficul
to assess the biases that may result. However, in light of the sampli
restrictions and the small impact of length of service on the qui
probability, they are probably not large. Perhaps the best alterna-
tives are to estimate quit models for cohorts having the same length o\
service, or a hazard function which accounts for variations in the quil
16
probability with length of service. These approaches are beyond the
o
scope of this study.
Table 3 presents the parameter estimates for the promotion
variable for the various subsamples referred to above. As can be seen
from the table, the sample was divided into three major fields of study
(rather than the fourteen shown in Table 1), and four functional areas
(rather than the six in Table 1). These groupings were dictated by the
need to maintain reasonable sample sizes. As the sample size
diminishes the likelihood of observing a significant effect falls as
well, tending to bias the results in the hypothesized direction. Thus
the subsamples chosen here are more heterogeneous than desired, but
represent a reasonable compromise between competing constraints.
Among the major fields, Table 3 shows no effect of promotions on
quits for scientists, a small but not significant impact for engineers,
and a large, significant impact for business-related majors (computer
science, accounting, finance and business). One interpretation of
these results is that the business related majors have the best
alternatives (or perhaps less commitment to the firm), and are there-
fore more responsive to absence of promotion than are employees in the
sciences or engineering. Alternatively, if this group is more hetero-
geneous than the other groups, the variance of promotions might be
greater, resulting in a more significant relationship with quitting.
In fact, the variance of promotions is greater among business majors
(.204) than among engineers (.174) or scientists (.161). However, the
difference is probably too small to account for the significant effect
of promotions on quitting estimated for the group.
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Among the functional divisions, promotion has no effect
quitting among research and marketing employees. However, there is
negative but not significant effect for production employees, and
significant effect for administration (finance, auditing, personnel a
other) employees. Although the administration group is the mo
heterogeneous, the variance of promotions among its employees is n
larger than for the marketing and production groups. Thus, the great
sensitivity to absence of promotion may reflect better alternatives,
some unknown source of job dissatisfaction.
The performance rating subsamples estimates suggest that 1
performers are more sensitive than high performers to absence
promotion, as expected. The two lowest performance groups have larg
negative coefficients, although only for the "good" group is t
relationship significant. (The lack of significance for the "satisfa
tcry" group may be due to the small sample size, which inflated t
standard error of the coefficient.) The best performers also show so
sensitivity of quitting to absence of promotion, although the effect
not significant. For these "excellent" performers, the pull
attractive alternatives may be especially important.
V. Conclusions
The study sought to test whether absence of recent promoti
increased the likelihood of voluntary separation, and whether m
promotion effect was the result of labor heterogeneity. The result
clearly support the first hypothesis: a significant negative relation
ship was estimated between recent promotion and quit probability. Th
estimated coefficient indicated a sizeable effect; those promoted ha
18
almost a one point lower probability of quitting than those who were
not promoted. The average quit rate of those promoted is .014,
compared with .023 for those not promoted.
With respect to the heterogeneity argument, there is some support
for the hypothesis. However, among the employees who majored in
business related subjects, a significant promotion effect remained. If
sample size limitations allowed further subdivision to individual
majors, a more thorough test would be possible. Among the firm's
functions, there is some evidence that absence of promotion increases
quit probabilities, although only one coefficient is significant. In
summary, promotion rates have a smaller effect on the more homogeneous
groups of employees, although the smaller sample sizes may have
influenced this outcome.
The major implication of these results is that failure to equalize
promotion rates among equally able employees results in increased
turnover. The need for employees to develop specific skills, not
transfer-able within the firm, is probably unavoidable. An interesting
direction for future research would be the development and testing of a
model that minimized turnover cost subject to the firm's skill require-
ments. This, however, would require estimation of a production
function with numerous distinct labor inputs.
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TABLE 1
PERCENT PROMOTED BY MAJOR FIELD OF STUDY FUNCTION AND PERFORN^
RATING*
Maior Field Performance Ratine
5
_4_ _1_ -2-
Chemical Engineering 33.5% 30.1% 24.2% 11 .6%
Electrical Engineering 45.7 28.7 19.3 8.7
Mechanical Engineering 29.6 26.9 19.8 7.5
Other Engineering 30.2 26.5 14.5 0.0
Chemistry 29.4 20.0 12.7 3.4
Physics 21.7 22.6 14.5 0.0
Biology 51.1 42.9 31.2 28.6
Other Sciences 62.5 41.2 31.6 0.0
Other Technical 60.0 23.1 18.5 0.0
Math 54.2 40.3 13.6 0.0
Computer Science 70.6 41.7 26.7 0.0
Accounting 41 .7 43.2 39.2 0.0
Finance 42.9 42.9 28.6 0.0
Business 37.7 32.7 21.4 4.9
Function
Finance/Auditing 48.8% 41 .1? 22.3% 0.0%
Production 36.1 31.7 23.2 7.7
Research 28.7 21.4 12.4 4.9
Personnel 34.4 30.1 21.4 0.0
Marketing 37.1 30.8 24.0 14.2
Other 37.9 25.8 18.7 1.8
* = The highest performance rating is 5, the lowest is 2.
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Table 2
Logit Estimates of Quit Model
(N = 8424 ; Mean of Quit = .0204)
Standard Chi-
Variable Mean Beta Error Square*
Intercept .942 1 .400 .45
Prevexp 1.736 .011 .053 .04
Prevexp 13.275 -.002 .003 .58
Service 13.600 -.275 .062 19.51
Service 2 225.577 .007 .002 9.51
Masters .216 -.316 .222 2.02
Doctorate .205 -.329 .309 1.13
Salary Ratio 1.001 - .554 1.328 .17
Salary Change .412 -1 .082 .696 2.42
Married .903 - .457 .217 4.44
Children .657 - .558 .195 8.22
PERFORMANCE = 3 .325 - .792 .244 10.55
PERFORMANCE = 4 .438 -1.281 .263 23.65
PEPFORMANCE = 5 .173 -1.011 .318 10.08
Promoted .227 - .511 .226 5.10
Fin/Audit .060 -1.110 .534 4.31
Production .296 .148 .225 .43
Personnel .030 - .185 .614 .09
Research .173 .147 .314 .22
Marketing .194 .409 .250 2.68
Comp. Science .004 1.364 .653 4.37
Accounting .015 1.290 .578 4.99
Finance .004 2.145 .689 9.68
Technician .004 .317 .818 .15
Math .015 .660 .603 1.20
Business .145 - .228 .381 .36
Sciences .271 - .271 .349 .61
Engineering .485 - .116 .330 .12
Grade 1 or 2 .006 1.157 .447 6.70
Grade 3 .042 .285 .275 1.08
* Wald (MLE) Chi-square statistic = (Beta/Standard error). 2
Values greater than 3.84 indicate significance at the .05 level
for a two-tailed test.
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Table 3
Loeit Estimates of Promotion Effect on Quit Probability bv Maic
Field, Function
r
Salary Grade and Performance Rating
Percent Std. Chi-
Group N Promoted Beta Error Square
Major FJleJ.d
Engineering 4088 22.4 -.619 .326 3.61
Sciences 2446 20.2 -.123 .442 .08
Business a 1410 28.4 -1.346 .606 4.94
Function
Administration b 2833 23.5 -1.137 .533 4.55
Production 2498 22.9 - .706 .396 3.19
Research 1456 18.8 - .302 .619 .24
Marketing 1637 24.7 - .105 .420 .06
Performance Ratine
Satisfactory (2) 535 3.2 -1.467 1.362 1.16
Good (3) 2736 17.2 -1.273 .472 7.28
Very Good (4) 3695 25.6 .087 .334 .07
Excellent (5) 1458 33.0 - .668 .534 1.56
Includes computer science, accounting, finance and
business
Includes Financial/Auditing, Personnel, and other
22
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Footnotes
1. In general, previous research has either used more aggregated d;
or data from multiple employers, studied blue collar workers,
focused on job satisfaction indicators obtained from emplo;
surveys. These approaches to quit behavior are reviewed below.
2. The following discussion loosely follows Weiss.
3. Eligible here means employed
incumbent for the vacancy.
in a position which qualifies
4. One might argue that specific training differences become le|
important at higher managerial levels, and thus that location
the firms hierarchy is also a segmentation factor. In this stul
high level executives and managers were deleted from the sampll
Within the sample there was no systematic variation in promoti|
rates across salary grades.
5. Tabulation of quit rates by years of service reveals that the rai
is over 7% for the first three years, falls to an average of abo
2.0% for three through 24 years, rises to 5% for years 25 throuf
33, and averages about 29 percent for employees with more than
years of service.
6. Discussions with the personnel department of the firm confirmed t
judgment regarding the low-rated performers. Separation codes
these data are not an accurate means of determining separatic
reason. However, the firm has a policy of terminating, or askir
for the resignation of only these employees who are rated c
unsatisfactory
.
7. The procedure used was to estimate the model without the set of
dummy variables. The difference in - 2 (log likelihood) between
the full and the restricted models follows a chi-square distribu-
tion with degrees of freedom = number of omitted variables.
For the major field dummies the calculated figure is 21.86 (8),
significant at p = .01; for the functions the figure is 11.10 (5),
significant at p = .05.
8. The author will pursue these alternatives in future research.
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